Ground Truth

The Black Sea Fortress

Crimea, twelve years after annexation: what has changed on the peninsula, between Russian construction, Ukrainian strikes and new coastal defences

by Piero Boccardo

When Russia formally annexed Crimea on 18 March 2014, the peninsula was a tourist destination with a Soviet heritage and a large naval base. Twelve years later, it is one of the most militarised and most struck territories on the European continent. Almost everything we know about what it looks like today comes from orbit: on the island — because Crimea has, in effect, become a political island — one cannot move freely, and local documentation is filtered through a Russian propaganda system that leaves no room for independent verification. High-resolution commercial satellites, particularly Planet’s SkySat and Pelican fleet, have photographed every significant development over the past twelve years: construction sites, attacks, reconstructions, new defences. What follows is an atlas in thirteen images.

The bridge

The Crimea Bridge across the Kerch Strait, completed in 2018, is the material symbol of the annexation: nineteen kilometres of road and rail carriageway connecting the peninsula to the Russian mainland of Krasnodar. It has been attacked twice. The first strike came on 8 October 2022, attributed to Ukrainian intelligence, and destroyed two road spans while severely damaging the railway section. The second, on 17 July 2023, hit the road carriageway with Ukrainian naval drones.

Kerch Bridge, 27 October 2022
Figure 1 — Kerch Bridge, 27 October 2022, three weeks after the first attack. The damaged road section and the emergency construction work to restore traffic are visible. Source: Planet SkySat.
Kerch Bridge, 13 August 2023
Figure 2 — Same sector, 13 August 2023, less than a month after the second attack. The dual road carriageway is again interrupted on the right side: the stumps of the fallen spans and the beginning of the second reconstruction campaign are recognisable. Source: Planet SkySat.
Kerch Bridge, 18 August 2024
Figure 3 — A year later, 18 August 2024, the bridge is once again intact. On the water surface around the piers, lines of barges and floating obstacles are visible, part of an anti-naval-drone protection system installed in 2024. Source: Planet SkySat.

The naval base

Sevastopol has for nearly two and a half centuries been the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Following the sinking of the cruiser Moskva in April 2022, and the missile strike on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in September 2023, Russia progressively transferred a significant portion of its surface units to Novorossiysk, on the Russian eastern Black Sea coast. Sevastopol nonetheless remains the most important military port on the peninsula, and the evolution of its naval presence is one of the most explicit indicators of the state of the conflict.

Sevastopol, 4 October 2022
Figure 4 — Sevastopol, 4 October 2022, six months after the sinking of the Moskva. The military port is still densely populated with surface units. Source: Planet Labs.
Sevastopol, 2 April 2026
Figure 5 — Sevastopol, 2 April 2026. Naval presence appears significantly reduced. A portion of the larger units has been transferred to Novorossiysk following the 2023–2024 campaign of missile and naval drone attacks by Ukraine. Source: Planet Labs.
Sevastopol, 3 April 2026
Figure 6 — Same sector, 3 April 2026, twenty-four hours later. The day-apart comparison allows the operational pattern to be followed: entry and exit of auxiliary units, positioning of floating pontoons, possible relocation of sensitive assets following overnight alerts. This is the type of tactical reading that daily SkySat-Pelican tasking makes possible. Source: Planet Labs.

The struck airfields

On 9 August 2022, a series of explosions devastated the Saky naval air base on the western coast of Crimea. It was the first visible demonstration — for the international public as well — that the war had reached the annexed territory. At least a dozen aircraft — among them Su-24s, Su-30s and Be-12s — were destroyed.

Saky, 9 August 2022
Figure 7 — Saky airfield, 9 August 2022, the same day as the attack. Aircraft pads with planes in regular positions, before the afternoon explosions, are recognisable. Source: Planet Labs.
Saky, 10 August 2022
Figure 8 — Same sector, 10 August 2022, twenty-four hours later. Craters on the apron, remains of destroyed aircraft, fire traces on the concrete, and the absence of most of the assets previously present are all visible. Source: Planet Labs.

Almost two years later, on 17 April 2024, Ukrainian forces struck Dzhankoy airfield in the north of the peninsula with US-supplied ATACMS tactical missiles, destroying an unspecified number of Mi-8 helicopters and S-400 air-defence batteries.

Dzhankoy, 19 April 2024
Figure 9 — Dzhankoy, 19 April 2024, two days after the ATACMS strike. Damaged structures and fire traces on the apron consistent with the destruction of parked helicopters and an air-defence position are visible. Source: Planet Labs.
Dzhankoy, 19 April 2024 (view II)
Figure 10 — Alternative view of the same site on the same day. The detail shows the dispersion of damaged areas and the absence of assets that, until a few weeks earlier, were regularly parked in that sector. Source: Planet Labs.

Air defences

Following the 2022–2024 attacks, Russia deployed in Crimea one of the densest air-defence systems on the entire front: S-400 and S-300 batteries along the coasts, mobile Pantsir and Buk systems covering the bases, long-range radar. The rationale is to protect the western flank of the peninsula from further missile strikes and long-range drone incursions.

Yevpatoria, 21 January 2026
Figure 11 — Yevpatoria, 21 January 2026. Coastal air-defence position: launchers in operational configuration, generators, personnel positions and camouflage are recognisable. It is one of the nodes of the S-400 network deployed to protect the western flank of Crimea. Source: Planet Labs.

Dragon’s teeth

Between 2023 and 2025, continuous lines of “dragon’s teeth” appeared along the southern and western coasts of Crimea — pyramid-shaped concrete blocks originally developed in the Soviet era to stop armoured vehicles — placed in close sequence on the beach, often in double or triple rows. These are anti-landing fortifications, designed to obstruct a potential Ukrainian amphibious operation, considered a not-remote possibility following the success of certain naval drone operations.

South-western coast of Crimea, 11 August 2024
Figure 12 — South-western coast of Crimea, 11 August 2024. Lines of dragon’s teeth, recognisable as regular closely-spaced dots, run parallel to the shoreline for hundreds of metres. Source: Planet Labs.
South-western coast of Crimea, 11 August 2024 (view II)
Figure 13 — Adjacent sector, same date. Zig-zag trenches behind the dragon’s teeth line and raised positions for machine guns and observers are recognisable, completed by service paths for supplying personnel. Source: Planet Labs.

The fortress

Thirteen images, five sites, twelve years. The Crimea that emerges from this atlas is not that of a consolidated military occupation, but that of a fortress in permanent tension: a territory that never stops being built while it is being struck, that produces defences while sustaining losses, that changes in morphology year after year under the eye of commercial satellites. From the ground, twelve years after annexation, almost no one enters Crimea anymore. From orbit, however, everything is visible.